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ABSTRACT 
This paper calls for a reexamination nf modern theories 
of regulation in the light of recent deregulation activity. Modern 
"revisionist" theories of regulation are derived from Downs' demonstration 
that a public official will maximize his own welfare by pursuing policies 
which provide identifiable benefits to groups which are well-organized 
politically. Various connnentators have explained the fact that much 
regulation is inefficient by showing that there are groups that benefit from 
the inefficient regulation and that those groups support both establishing 
and continuing regulation, These theories are couched in terms that do 
not predict or account for the dismantling of any regulatory scheme 
which is providing benefits to some groups at the expense of the 
general public, Unfortunately f o r  this view of the process, the last 
several years have seen deregulation of airlines, trucking, brokerage 
commissions, cable television, and others. Perhaps "bad" regulation 
is the product of mistakes rather than the inevitable product of a 
democratic political system. Airline deregulation is examined in detail 
and seems to support resurrection in modified form of the "public interest" 
theory of regulatory origin previously thought obsolete. 
REVISIONISM REVISED? AIRLINE DEREGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Michael E. Levine* 
From the Progressive Era through the 1 950s, we thought we 
understood regulation. It was generated, we knew, by problems with 
laissez faire. TheBB problems came to be known as "market failures". 
Regulation operated to cure market failures by substituting the expert 
planning decisions of an administrative agency for the defective 
allocations of the failed market. 1 Regulators sifted facts, rendered 
and explained their judgments, and generally did a creditable if 
flawed job, or so we thought. This view of the origins and operation 
of the process came to be known as the "public interest" theory of 
regulation. 
By the late 1 950s, this view of the process began to change. 
An outpouring of scholarly work continuing through the 1960s and into 
the 1 970s suggested that regulation did not work very well. Aa 
scholars examined the record of regulated industries, they found 
prices which were too high or too low, distorted allocations, 
mercantile protection, suppression of innovation, extension of 
regulation beyond the bounds of any known market failure and 
protection of entrenched interests, corporate or geographic, from any 
change at all costs. 2 
In the face of these discoveries, the public interest theory 
did not survive, The scholarly view of the regulatory process changed 
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from one of control of private behavior for the public benefit to one 
of use of goverrunental powers for private or sectional gain. 3 Thia 
pattern emerged frequently enough to inapire speculation about the 
"true" sources of regulation and about the "true" motives of 
regulators. While no single explanation gained unanimous acceptance, 
a kind of "cluster consensus" appeared. This consensus characterized 
regulation as a device used by relatively small subgroups of the 
general population, either private corporations or geographic or 
occupational groups• to produce results favorable to them which would 
not be produced by the market. The regulatory services provided were 
variously described as organization of a cartel, wealth transfers as a 
form of "taxation", enshrinement of capitalistic class interests, or 
preservation of congressional and bureaucratic power.4 Of course, all
gains, whether from regulation or the market, are in a sense realized 
by private human beings. The operational significance of this view of 
regulation is that goverrunent processes are used by organized 
subgroups of the population to enforce inefficient arrangements which 
transfer wealth or power to them. 
By 1976, Roger Noll, in a survey of theories of regulation and 
administrative behavior, could describe public interest theories as 
"traditional" and 11no longer widely shared". 5 Another commentator 
began a 1 977 article on regulation as follows: "It seems fair to say 
that among economists the most widely accepted theory of goverrunent 
regulation· is that, as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry 
regulated and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit •116 
Ironically, as this new academic consensus emerged, the Securities and 
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Exchange Commission (SEC) deregulated brokerage cODUDiesions• a 
thirty-five year old system of agriculture price supports was 
dismantled, airlines were deregulated, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) deregulated the communications equipment business and 
began to consider (along with Congress) deregulating cable television 
and common-carriage message service, and the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) and the Senate started to deregulate trucking. None 
of these events is predicted or explained very well by revisionist 
theories of regulation. Rather, one arguably might predict and 
explain this activity by reviving the public interest theory of 
regulation in a modified form: namely, by asserting that both 
Congress and agencies attempt to regulate business activity to promote 
general welfare, but are sometimes misled by private or sectional 
misrepresentations designed to secure governmental action favoring 
more narrow populations. Although these attempts to influence the 
regulatory process may succeed at first for Downsian7 reasons, 
mistakes (whether ab initio or generated over time by technical 
circumstantial change) tend to be publicized and corrected. If true, 
this view of regulation would require us once again to recast the way 
we look at regulation. 
This paper will focus on airline deregulation in an initial 
attempt to explore the hypothesis. To do so. we must develop at least 
a working definition of "public interest" regulation and give 
operational meaning both to this definition and to the revisionist 
theory in the specific context of airline deregulation, Then we can 
look at the facts of airline deregulation to see which 
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characterization best fits and explains the events we have observed. a 
If this inquiry establishes that a revised version of the public 
interest theory is more consistent with recent airline regulation 
evidence than are revisionist theories, examples from other agencies 
should be examined in future work to see whether a general theory can 
be supported. 
There have been a great many contributors to the revisionist 
literature on regulation, but examination of the literature exposes 
common themes arrayed along a central line of development. The 
central notion underlying virtually all revisionist theory comes from 
Downs. 9 Downs posits a government run by individuals trying to 
maximize a private, rather than public, utility function, In effect, 
he asks us to view public officials not as officials primarily 
concerned with public matters, but rather as private individuals 
trying to maximize their own utility much in the way a firm maximizes 
profits. Just as businessmen compete with other businessmen to 
accumulate consumer dollars which will bring them wealth, politicians 
compete with each other for electoral support which keep them in 
office (their "wealth") and bureaucrats deal with the public and the 
legislature to accumulate power, prestige, tenure, etc. From this it 
follows that public officials will try to assemble coalition• of 
support, Individuals and groups support public officials whose 
actions make those individuals or groups better off, either 
financially or by satisfying their "tastes" for public policies. 
But supporting an official -- even if only by voting --
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entails cost� which will only willingly be borne if the payoff from a 
public policy to an individual or group exceeds the cost of supporting 
the public official who will implement it. Accordingly , those 
willing to put the most effort into supporting public officials are 
those whose gains from a particular policy most exceed the cost of 
implementing it, and public officials can best gain support by 
inventing or supporting policies which provide disproportionate 
benefits to groups who are in a position to affect political outcomes 
by delivering votes (or money to attract votes) or by supporting the 
activities of an agency. 
Using this central notion, one can proceed to derive the 
central themes of the revisionist view of regulation. Policies which 
generate economic profits (rents) are likely to gain support from the 
groups in whose favor the profits will be distributed. One method of 
generating rents is to limit entry into an industry and to facilitate 
price coordination. According to Stigler, groups which can benefit 
from this kind of intervention use the political process to persuade 
legislators to create regulatory agencies to accomplish it.10 These 
groups are ordinarily private firms. If a group of users or a 
geogrphic area has low enough organization costs compared to potential 
benefits from intervention, it too will influence the political 
process to intervene in markets for the group's benefit. Thie 
intervention will generally take the form of what Posner has called 
"taxation by regulation1111, namely use of the regulatory process to
generate monopoly profits from users who are not specially organized 
in order to finance excess service (compared to revenues) for the 
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favored group or geographic area, 
Kolkol2 has developed a revisionist account of the origins of 
regulation which is essentially Marxist in its use of class concepts, 
but which produces results strikingly similar to the Downsian line of 
development, He posits capitalists who find market competition 
unprofitable and consumer sovereignty unattractive and who seize 
control of the apparatus of the state in order to establish and 
preserve monopoly positions. In order to succeed politically in doing 
so, they exploit populist sentiment which favors controlling 
monopolies through regulation. Thus regulatory mechanisms are 
created, supposedly to satisfy popular demand, but actually to permit 
capitalists to use the government to eliminate market forces which 
operate to reduce their profits. 
Revisionist account• of the legialative origin of regulation 
are integrated with revisionist accounts of agency-created regulation 
by Fiorina and Noll.13 They deacribe a proceaa in which legialators 
who want to be reelected discover that individual service to 
constituents, and particularly help to constituent& having difficulty 
with government agencies is a particularly effective form of vote­
getting 1 not least because it cuts across party lines and isaue 
positions. At the same time, bureaucrats who wish to continue in 
their jobs and who favor their own continued intervention into the 
economy discover that it is in their interest to be reaponsive to 
inquiries from legislators on behalf of their constituents. And of 
course, potential beneficiaries continue to be interested in 
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interventions which will transfer wealth to them, The result, as seen 
by Fiorina and Noll, is a powerful conjunction of forces in favor of 
establishing and continuing regulation, Legislators, bureaucrats and 
favored constituents unite to create complex programs which transfer 
wealth, The legislator gets credit every time he helps a constituent 
deal with bureaucratic complexity, independently of the position he or 
the constituent take on the desirability of the underlying program, 
The bureaucrat gets
. 
to run a bigger program, organized in ways that 
increase his discretion, Any constituent benefited by the program, of 
course, remains in favor of it, Any constituents who oppose a program 
in general but wh� can benefit from assistance in dealing with it 
ignore those general views in favor of supporting legislators whose 
help is financially more salient to them -- incumbents who know their 
way around the bureaucracy, So powerful is this combination that 
Fiorina and Noll predict that rational legislators will voluntarily 
choose to make a program of intervention more complicated, 
discrel:ionary, administrative and "regulatory" than it need be to 
accomplish its purpose because doing so maximizes the political 
advantage to be gained from it. 
In summary, examining revisionist theories of regulation, 
reveals a great many common threads: Revisionist theories owe a great 
deal to Downs, They posit groups with relatively low organization 
cost• relative to their possible gains from political intervention who 
become disproportionately influential in the political process, These 
groups persuade Congress to set up a framework which will transfer 
wealth to them through the regulatory process, If the group is a 
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private firm or firms, the government service may take the form of a 
cartel run at public expense, If the groups are user or geographic in 
nature, the regulation will often take the form of what Posner bas 
called "taxation", generating monopoly profits from some disfavored 
sector of the public and transferring them as excess services for the 
benefit of the favored sector, A Marxist such as Kolko may describe 
all this in class terms rather than the more general Downsian 
analysis, but the end result is largely the same, And finally Fiorina 
and Noll describe an elaborate interaction of legislators, 
bureaucrats, and favored groups joining bands to achieve wealth 
transfers through the regulatory process which will redound to the 
credit of the legislators and to the vocational benefit of the 
bureaucrats, 
These theories of regulatory genesis are closely related to 
theories of regulatory behavior, The cartel theory of origin 
generates a corresponding view of agency behavior which has a close 
counterpart in the "capture" theory, 14 The capture theory aeems
implicitly to accept the possiblity of a public interest view of 
agency origin but postulates that, whatever the reasons that may have 
created a regulatory agency, it becomes captured by the industry it 
regulates and acts as a protector and cartel manager for that 
industry, A refinement of this view has the agency operating so as to 
continually shift resources in somebody's favor, thus maximizing its 
political power, The beneficiary of the wealth shift will change from 
producers to consumers to subgroups of consumers, depending on demand 
shifts and technical changes, but the wealth shifts will be undertaken 
without regard to efficiency.15 
This view, in turn, is buttressed by Fiorina'el6 general 
theory of the interaction between Congress and bureaucrats. Fiorina 
postulates legislators who win reelection by influencing governmental 
processes which affect wealth to operate in their constituents' favor. 
For such influence to be possible, government intervention in the form 
of regulation needs to exist and the regulators need to be cooperative 
in the way they carry out their mandate. Thus the "iron triangle1117 
of legislators, regulators, and beneficiaries affects the operations 
as well as the geneses of regulatory agencies. Some theories of 
regulation postulate regulatory activity as an essentially defensive 
response to external pressures or signals.IS Others have suggested 
that regulation can be made so complex and formalized that it operates 
as an employment project administered by and for the benefit of 
lawyers.19 And Mashaw has given an account of regulatory genesis and 
operation which combines problem misperception, urgency and misplaced 
confidence in government efficacy to produce regularized patterns of 
regulatory inefficiency.20 
The problem with these theories is that they cannot 
accommodate, or can accommodate only with extreme difficulty, moves by 
regulators or Congress .!!lt!Y from regulation and toward efficiency and 
reduction in bureaucratic discretionary power. The cartel theory and 
theories of bureaucratic power-maximizing and the "iron triangle" seem 
not to allow at all for reductions in the amount of regulatory 
activity. Peltzman's more generalized wealth-transfer theory21 seems to 
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allow for a certain amount of bureaucratic (as distinct from 
legislative) transfers in favor of the public, but not for relaxation 
of bureaucratic controlo or dismantling of the apparatus. Theories of 
agency reaction to outside pressure would not seem to suggest 
deregulation in the face of strong unanimous industry opposition. The 
lawyer-employment theory would account for deregulation activity only 
if lawyers had a remarkably high discount rate and were prepared to 
gratefully accept the jobs created by a major brawl over deregulation 
at the expense of the stream of employment created by the continued 
existence of a regulatory agency and a bar to deal with it. And 
Mashaw's complicated account ends with a whimper rather than a bang, 
with the disillusioned public waiting exhausted and demoralized for a 
new (and presumably equally flawed) regulatory process cycle. None of 
the theories suggest that efficiency will be a prime focus or effect 
of congressional or regulatory concern with continued government 
intervention in the economy. 
A major problem �ith theories of regulation is that they are 
difficult to express in forms which are rich enough to avoid 
caricature and yet sufficiently defined to be refutable.22 This aeema
to be especially true of the public interest theory. Formal efforts 
to define a social welfare optimum (the 11public interest") proceed by 
specifying the effect of each alternative world-state on each 
individual. Then, depending on the.analyst, one continues either by
comparing these effects across individuals or by refusing to do eo and 
accepting as superior only those world-states that improve (or at 
least do not worsen) the lot of each individual in the society. A 
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third possibility is to compare states of the world according to an 
objective standard (conformity with religious law, for example) and 
ignore its effects on individuals. Accordingly, to determine formally 
whether a proposed action is in the public interest seems to require a 
definition of the public interest which either is independent of 
private interests or is linked to private interests through a social 
welfare function. In a complicated world, few actions benefit 
everyone. And there is rarely sufficient agreement on intrinsic 
values to allow judgment of outcomes independently of their effects on 
individuals. And even where a Pareto-superior alternative to the 
status quo exists, it cannot be the automatic choice, using effects on 
individuals on as a guide, if it benefits some individuals less than 
they would be benefitted under other, more skewed, arrangements or if 
there is more than one Pareto-superior choice, each with its own 
constellation of bigger and smaller winners. So an action's 
11unweighted11 effects on individuals cannot determine whether it is in 
the public interest. And attempting to weight those interests with a 
social welfare function (a systematic method of comparing and summing 
individual utilities to determine collective good) suffers from the 
defects which were the subject of Arrow's famous "impossibility" 
proof, 23 from which formal escape has so far eluded an army of 
scholars, 24 
What then can we mean by regulation 11in the public interest"? 
Suppose we sidestep formal specification and look at the problem 
paradigmatically. At least three paradigms could be appealed to in 
asserting that some exercise of the power of the state is in the 
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public interest. There is an efficiency paradigm which, crudely put, 
says that government activities which increase output are, in general, 
in the public interest. There is a distributional paradigm whose 
exact content, even expressed crudely, is the subject of great debate, 
but which says, loosely, that distributional effect• are considered in 
determining the public interest only to the extent that they exceed a 
threshold which justifies intervention by the state and then to the 
extent that they involved making a specially favored group wealthier 
or a disfavored group poorer. There is probably agreement that 
infants and the congenitally infirm are among the favored classes and 
that criminals (that is, those committing specific acts which are 
regarded as punishably immoral) are to be disfavored. After that, 
there is much dispute, but fairly wide recognition that there are at 
least some favored groups and some disfavored groups and that it is 
the proper business of government to shift wealth toward the former 
and away from the latter. Indeed, even Nozick, who is widely thought 
to represent the minimalist end of the spectrum in terms of his 
willingness to redistrbute, agrees (however reluctantly) that there is 
at least one possible group in favor of whom intervention is 
justified. 25 
This brings us to a third paradigm, the process paradigm, 
which says that government intervention designed to improve efficiency 
or (especially) to redistribute wealth must be undertaken in 
accordance with governmental processes accepted as fair, and that even 
actions which otherwise resemble the efficiency and distributional 
paradigms will not be in the public interest if they are not 
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undertaken in a way which satisfies the process paradigm. The reason 
that actions taken under the distributional paradigms are singled out 
for emphasis in accordance with the process paradigm may lie in a 
recognition that the sum of efficiency improvements over time is 
likely to benefit everyone at least a little while it is very unlikely 
that the same will be true of the sum of distributional adjustments, 
Consensus on the application of the distribution or efficiency 
paradigms is often hard to achieve, so that achieving process 
acceptability is necessary to ensure acceptance of government actions 
justified by reference to the first two paradigms, 
Using a paradigmatic approach does not exactly allow us to 
escape all our problems. The entire range of judgments necessary to 
determine formally or informally whether an action is in the public 
interest is beset with difficulties. Some are so fundamental as to be 
essentially unmanageable. For example, when we talk about 
"efficiency", we must make a whole set of assumptions which we know 
are incorrect as matters of fact. We know that price is not equal to 
marginal cost everywhere in the economy, but attempts to take the 
general theory of second beet seriously and derive policy implications 
from it have not been very successful. When we talk about 
distributional fairness, we know that individual utility functions are 
not independent, that A's level of satisfaction with any given bundle 
of wealth is very often closely linked to how well B is doing; but we 
do not have any systematic way of taking this into account which 
avoids paradox. When we talk about process fairness, we know that the 
procedures used to reach a result may profoundly influence the 
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outcome, yet w e  can prove that we cannot construct a neutral agenda. 
All we can do in cases like these is to acknowledge the problem 
with regret and then fall back on the need to continue to say 
something about an important human activity. In this connection many 
will find comforting the fact that many of the predictions derived 
from flawed positive theories are borne out reasonably well in 
practice, and that many of the normative judgements produced by 
applying flawed value structures through procedures seem to command 
fairly widespread allegiance. Aa Stigler, in a remarkably candid 
moment, once asserted! 
"What can the economist respond to a person (say a psychiatrist) 
who insists that � does not maximize utility? It would be easy 
to persuade him that he does not minimize utility! after all he 
is alive, and not drinking crankcase oil. It would also be 
possible • , , to point to empirical implications of the assumptions, 
but since these implications began to be developed only about ¥J 
years after the theory was proposed (18 71 ) ,  what led economists to 
assert it? 
The main reason was introspection. Everyone bas irrational 
foibles: a common one is to refuse to put extra postage on a 
letter if one does not have the exact denomination, thus saving 
one or two cents, at the cost of a more expensive special trip to 
the post off ice, Yet by and large our actions are geared to the 
goals we seek to achieve. Introspective evidence will never 
convince a skeptic, and perhaps the only remarkable thing about 
introspection is that vi�tually every economist found it convincing 
over so long a period, 1126 
There are other problems which seem less fundamental. In the 
end, techniques used to deal with them differ from those we use to 
deal with the .Y.I_-problems only in that we are less a11Xious when we use 
them. For example, one could object that the public interest paradigm 
may well have the features posited above, but that establishing the 
content of the public interest paradigm does not also establish that 
people engaged in considering or evaluating regulation actually� 
this paradigm in doing so. Once again, one probably can never 
convince a co11U11itted skeptic, but repeated and persistent use of 
public interest language by both proponents and opponents of 
regulation leaves one with the choice of assuming that they are 
proceeding with reference to the "public interest" language they are 
using or adopting the more heroic position that when they talk about 
public interest they are really pursuing something else. In fact, 
Posner himself has identified the tendency to do the second as a 
weakness in revisionist theory.27 
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All this hopefully allows us to assert operationally that 
regulation which reduces efficiency while redistributing wealth in 
favor of a group not widely accepted as especially deserving is not in 
the public interest. It follows also that governmental activity 
which increases efficiency while redistributing in favor of a group 
widely regarded as deserving is in the public interest. No activity 
undertaken outside acceptable process limits (e.g., through secret 
influence or bribery) ie ordinarily regarded as in the public 
intereat. After that, and particularly when the activity results in 
some results which can be characterized as "efficient but 
maldistributed11, or "inefficient but fair"• the matter becomes much 
harder. But even in such hard cases. argument proceeds by reference 
to the paradigms, Thus. an advocate of a program argues that his 
group is deserving and downplays inefficiencies, or an advocate for a 
broader consumer group will tend to emphasize the efficiencies that 
will be produced by a proposal and tend to minimize distributional 
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impacts on specific groups, And if fraud is to be undertaken in the 
pursuit of public policy, it centers on false claims of efficiency or 
of misrepreaentation of beneficiaries (as when agribusinesses use the 
plight of nearly nonexistent poor family farmers to justify a crop or 
water subsidy). As noted above, this paradigmatic approach has the 
virtue of being consistent with the public-interest dominated rhetoric 
of debates about regulation, where the revisionist theories must 
postulate not merely some fraud and dissembling in debate, but an 
entire process which fraudulently avoids discussing the "real" issues 
at stake, 28 
A public interest theory of airline regulation. then. would 
posit that unless it either increased efficiency or provided a wealth 
shift in favor of a group recognized by consensus ae worthy of 
support, or (preferably) both. airline regulation could not be created 
or, if created (by mistake or by pressure designed to mislead 
Congress), could not be maintained, 
With this in mind. let us examine airline deregulation and, 
through it, the genesis of airline regulation itself, Both Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB)-initiated and Congressionally-mandated 
revisions in domestic airline regulation had the following 
characteristics unaccounted for by revisionist theories! 
(1) They involved less control, not more, over the activities 
of the airline industry. This gave the agency and Congress less 
discretion and less ability to deliver services to geographical 
constituents or private firms who had previously benefited from the 
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exercise of regulatory discretion. It diminished considerably the 
power of the agency to create economic rents or to transfer wealth. 29 
(2) Airline deregulation reduced both the size and the power 
of the Civil Aeronautics Board, 30 
(3) Airline deregulation was promoted as efficiency-increasing 
and was administered to pursue that goal. Such deviations as were 
made from promoting efficient outcomes were made knowingly and as 
minor exceptions to insure the political survival of a program that on 
the whole removed many more redistributionist interventions than it 
added. For example, the small communities service guarantee program 
written into the act removes the Board's power to create rents and 
transfer them through cross-subsidy, It requires the CAB to 
explicitly identify the service it is subsidizing and the cost to the 
taxpayer for providing such service. By revisionist analysis, this 
should reduce the Board's ability to overprovide service, since the 
overprovision can be readily identified and its cost known to those 
who support it without benefitting from it, 31 And in fact, since 
deregulation, subsidized service has been tailored much more closely 
to actual demand than was previously the case. 
(4) The political appeal of airline deregulation was to a 
large, undifferentiated mass of airline consumers, many of whom were 
not regular users. If anything, heavy business users of airline 
services may have lost through deregulation subsidies in the form of 
excessive service frequency and seat access which were being supported 
to them by overcharging infrequent discretionary travelers.32
(5) The airline industry strenuously resisted deregulation, 
This industry was well organized and well financed and, by Downsian 
analysis, should have been disproportionately influential in the 
legislative and regulatory process, It was not, however, a worthy 
object of redistributionist beneficence in terms of the public 
interest theory articulated above. 33 
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(6) After initial resistance, the CAB not only supported, but 
actively promoted, airline deregulation and its own sunset in 1985. 34 
This is not accounted for by revisionist histories of regulation, nor 
is either CAB support for deregulation nor the ultimate Congressional 
endorsement of deregulation easily reconciled with 11iroil triangle" 
theories. How can we accommodate these awkward events within the 
existing consensus theories about regulation? 
One could perhaps explain that those in charge of the CAB 
during the relevant period were not "typical" bureaucrats because they 
were tenured scademics or 11profeuional deregulators1135 or both. But 
this explanation has several difficulties! First, the revisionist 
theories of regulation do not posit the character of the bureaucrats 
as a variable. 36 Rather, they posit basic forces acting on agencies 
and on the Congress which will produce the results they predict 
regardless of who is running the agency or, alternatively, which will 
operate to select regulatore who are comfortable "delivering the 
goods" in accordance with revisionist theories. In a sense, the 
character of bureaucrats is for the revisionists a dependent rather 
than independent variable. Second, deregulation was supported by 
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former practicing lawyers (without tenure) John Robson in the Ford 
administration and Marvin Cohen as Alfred Kahn's successor, as well as 
by other members of the Board and the Board's staff. Their 
backgrounds were fairly typical of those appointed to or staffing 
regulatory commissions, and they certainly did not all have assured 
fall-back alternatives. Could they All have been atypical? And if it 
is possible for an entire agency to be atypical in a fundamental way 
for a period of four years, bow robust can the consensus theory of 
agency behavior theory be? 
Imposition of airline deregulation over the opposition of the 
industry and the aviation bar is flatly inconsistent with the Stigler 
hypothesis and the capture bypothesis1 and possible to explain in 
terms of the lawyer-dominance hypothesis, the Peltzman hypothesis and 
the Posner taxation hypotheses only if the actors and claimants 
pref erred to play in one spectacular but short-lived 
"Glltterdllunnerung", rather than an essentially endless series of more 
modest· dramas. Eliminating rate regulation37 on the upside as well as 
the downside is difficult to reconcile with the Peltzman modification 
of the Stigler theory, since it leaves the agency in no position to 
continue to alternate in bestowing benefits on the industry and user 
groups. Entry control was eliminated without any clear knowledge on 
anyone's part as to which firms would benefit and which would be 
harmed. What had been established by the California and Texas 
examples was that less control on entry would benefit the public and 
some firms which were difficult to identify, probably at the expense 
of other established carriers,38 
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But all of these awkward facts are consistent with a story 
that goes something like tbis1 In 1938, it appeared to the general 
public and the Congress that uncontrolled markets did not work very 
well for the public over the long run. Although markets produced low 
prices during the Depression years, many producers went out of 
business, The airline business was relatively new, Congress bad 
little experience with it, and there was no .reason not to apply 
general skepticism about markets to airlines, Doubts about airline 
markets were reinforced by the fact that firms were continuing to 
attempt entry, Notwithstanding this dismal picture, a modern analyst 
would say that these firms were looking past the Depression at a 
bright future for a new technology. But it seemed to Congress that 
mistakenly optimistic entrepreneurs were aeeking profitable operations 
where none were possible, draining away resources needed for further 
extension of the airline system in fruitless and profitless 
competitive struggles for existing business. Firms which had invested 
substantial resources in pioneering air transportion would become the 
innocent victims of still another example of market competition run 
riot. 
It was therefore not difficult for the airline industry to 
persuade Congress and the public that the fledgling airline industry 
would go the way of many other Depression-era firms and that the full 
potential of aviation could not be developed in a free-market 
environment, This would be both inefficient and unfair, Whether the 
industry sincerely believed this, merely hoped for the benefits of 
cartelizaton, or both is immaterial. It made its case, Trucking bad 
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been too recently regulated for the deleterious long-term effects of 
regulation to become known. The enormous overinveetment in railroad 
plant39 masked any rents that ICC railroad regulation might have been 
generating for private firms. The damage to the interests of the 
public as a whole from cross-subsidy as well as its limited 
effectiveness in securing the desired services were not well 
understood, while regional intrastructural development through public 
intervention bad been characteristic of anti-Depression strategy. And 
there was enough faith in what Mashaw has called "the ideology of 
government efficacy1140 for the Congress and the public to believe that 
an expert agency could secure for the public most of the benefits of 
competition without subjecting the public to the disadvantages of its 
"excesses", 
Whatever its vices, this story has the singular virtue of 
being consistent with the legislative history of the 1938 act,41 This
history, which many, including myself, 42 have tried with only
indifferent success to square with the government-services theory, 
contains numerous statements (including Senate floor manager 
McCarran's well-known remarks relating to entry control)43 which seem 
to suggest that the Congress was not intentionally freezing entry nor 
thereby creating a cartel for the sole benefit of the airlines and a 
few isolated geographic areas, While it is not bard for an 
experienced observer of the legislative process to generate the 
cynicism necessary to turn the legislative history as it is into one 
that will support the currently-held theory of regulatory origin, lees 
adjustment of this history is required to accept the modified public-
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interest hypothesis. This modified public-interest theory says that 
airline regulation was imposed by a Congress attempting to act in the 
public interest which made a mistake, 
Of course, the industry was eloquent in its predictions of the 
benefits of regulation and the ruin impending without it, but most of 
those arguments were cast in a form designed to appeal to the 
efficiency paradigm or alternatively to line the industry up as a 
worthy secondary legatee in its own right with the traveling and 
shipping public, the post office, and the national defense aa the 
prime beneficiaries of a governmentally-stabilized airline industry, 
The revisionist account requires that we posit that the administration 
and the members of Congress were primarily motivated in seeking 
regulation by the potential wealth gains to the industry and that all 
were cynical enough to focus their rhetoric principally on gains to 
the public known to be illusory, An experienced Washington observer 
would probably not want to reject such a possiblity out of hand for an 
individual instance, but as a general hypothesis it is sufficiently 
strained that one would wish to assert it only if the evidence seemed 
to require it. Before the recent spate of deregulations justified on 
public interest grounds, the evidence seemed that way to many of us. 
But the material presented here on airline deregulation suggests that 
perhaps public interest rhetoric accurately reflects the intentions of 
legislators and bureaucrats much more often than we had supposed, 
Using hindsight, the "obvious" benefits to the public may have been 
greatly overstated, but it is surely simpler and more consistent with 
a long view of the evidence to assume mistake on the part of a 
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Congress and a Roosevelt Administration trying to benefit the public 
at large than to insist on the existence of a widely-coordinated 
effort by government to transfer wealth from the general public to the 
airlines. 
Over time. scholarly assessments of the performance of the 
regulated industry suggested that airlines operated better without 
regulation, Congressional leaders thought it politically beneficial 
and perhaps even consistent with their legislative duty to make 
changes which might benefit the public. Although the factors 
described by Downs. 44 Posner, 45 and Stigler46 undoubtedly affected 
both the original legislation and its revision, those forces (in the 
form of industry and sectional pressure for favored treatment) 
operated as a deflection rather than the main thrust of either 
regulation or its revision, In the meantime, this scholarly output. 
as well as observations that all was not as well as it could be in the 
regulated industry. led to the appointment of regulators who were 
prepared to make important changes in the direction of efficiency, 
even at the expense of agency power, 
In the executive and administrative contexts. Robson and the 
Ford administration began the process of educating Congress and the 
public to the ills produced by airline regulation and to the potential 
benefits of deregulation, Senator Kennedy gave the process major 
impetus in the Senate through the 1975 hearings before his 
subcol!Dllittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Certainly the 
industry opposed deregulation, as did many members of Congress and the 
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public. and this opposition was reflected in the timidity of the CAB'a 
early efforts as well as in the restrained tone of early legislative 
proposals, But at least some of the industry and public opposition, 
and much of the Congressional skepticism, stemmed from uncertainty 
about the effects of dismantling a system that had produced at least 
minimally satisfactory results for forty years, Thia uncertainty was 
reinforced by the fact that the particular misallocation produced by 
CAB regulation had been airline service in many respects bett er than 
the market would otherwise have provided at high price& that excluded 
many potential customers, Since the service was present, identifiable 
and tangible while the price savings and the excluded masses were 
hypothetical and not associated with easily identifiable individuals, 
would-be deregulatora had a difficult time convincing skeptics of the 
"if it ain't broke, don't fix it" genre, In fact, the demonstrable 
price and service benefits of California and Texas intrastate 
experiments with competition were probably indispenaible to the task 
of persuading skeptics that the apparently satisfactory CAB-regulated 
system was not in fact functioning in the public interest, 
But. the telling fact for our purposes is that this initially 
doubtful Congressional faction (including Senator Cannon, the powerful 
chairman of both the Aviation Subcommittee and the full Commerce 
Committee) ultimately helped control the legislative process in favor 
of deregulation. which by then was perceived to be in the public 
interest, And it did so in the face of diehard opposition by factions 
(including the industry) whose positions were undermined by the 
ultimate transparency of the degree to which their positions were 
motivated by purely private, rather than "public interest 11, 
considerations of gain and loss. And, on the administrative side, 
even conceding that Chairman Kahn and his chief staff aides had 
relatively little to lose by the diminution of CAB power, these 
changes were supported by an initially skeptical but ultimately 
convinced career staff and by members of the Board who were prepared 
to see their own power diminished for the benefit of the public. 
This scenario may seem painfully quaint to moot readers. It 
is certainly not aelf-evidently correct. But it is consistent with 
the rhetoric of the legislative and administrative history, with the 
facts of airline deregulation and with the existence of a broader 
movement to deregulate other industries as well. Ockham's razor47 
(the principle that simple explanations are to be preferred to 
complicated ones, all else being equal), if nothing else, requires 
that we give serious attention to this hypothesis. And this account 
of the dynamica of airline regulation is consistent with preliminary 
work done by Kashaw48 with respect to the origins of the 1962 drug 
regulation and by Kitch49 with respect to the origins of the ICC Act. 
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Kuch work needs to be done. As always, it will be better done 
if performed with an open mind. Ultimately, it may be possible to 
I 
synthesize a modification of the public-interest theory using the work 
that forms the underpinning of the current consensus on regulation. 
Such a synthesis will not require us to revise carefully buttressed 
scholarly view• of the inefficien� y of regulation nor to deny that 
there exist powerful incentives for private groups to attempt to 
obtain particular regulatory benefits. But a new public interest 
theory will require us to reassess the prospects for the persistence 
of regulation demonstrated to be inefficient and undesirable. In 
this, as well as other areas, it may be that the political process 
produces better results than theorists can account for. 
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they have established, On the other hand, we desire to 
give them the best of 'the break,' if I may use a common 
expression, 
Again referring to public necessity and convenience, permit 
me to use an illustration with which th Senator is familiar. 
34 
If it could be established to the satisfaction of the Authority 
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to sustain the other lines, Therefore we can grant a franchise 
to another line,' But before that could be done, full and complete 
hearings would have to be had, So we are trying to set up a 
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